This “sole subject matter”, die Sache Selbst, cannot be a position. That is, can’t be a fixed point of view, immutable, and unresponsive. It can’t be a position in a catalog of stances one might find limned out in a text book - the sort of thing that students of philosophy prattle on about, say in American University programmes when talking about ethics.
For Hegel, the ethical shows itself in and through all possible positions or knowledges… But this absolute is a knowledge itself - yet - in the same way that knowledge is the “valid coinage” at Phaedo 69a-b: knowledge as phronesis.
In the Preface to the PhG, §51, Hegel goes on about missing the inner life and self-movement for the sake of constructions… and pigeon holing everything such that the living essence, die Sache, ends up “stripped away and boxed up dead.” So, it is a great danger I think to use the term “position” with regard to Hegel, since the “untutored mind” will tend to take this in the same way as a “report clear as noonday”, the kind of soulless labeling that dominates the external cognition of philosophy still to this day.
One misses the movement, even the astonishing irony we see at paragraph §52, where even the error, fate, and/or superficiality of stances, positions and monochromatic determinations are yet, at the same time, though in a different respect [Metaph IV 3 1005b19–20], faces of the activity of the absolute.
The latter shows itself in and through the former. Each position in the PhG is a marker along a highway of despair, as each figure of consciousness, each Gestalt, in taking and holding on to a position sees it slip away. That’s what I meant by “forever flawed and [undoing] itself”.
Moreover, by showing itself the constellation of positions are faces of Spirit’s self-presentation. This Darstellung (the actuality or playing out of the Kantian Transcendental Deduction) is not something that Hegel contributes. It’s not his “position”; it’s not even his movement.
Now, we have a peculiar contrivance or framework in the PhG that might be loosely called a position, that of the Phenomenological Observer… the “We see…” However, I would submit that it’s more of a case of a ladder being pulled up behind itself akin to Tractatus 6.54, and that taking that too seriously as a “position” would be nonsensical.
In short, everything in Hegel is about seeing the real thing step forth, a negation of negation, whereby any alienation into positions and fields of objectivity is, in turn, surpassed in an ethical necessity. The torsion of this necessity reduces all to nothing insofar as a limited position cannot let go and tries to maintain itself however rigorously. Perhaps that necessity comes to grasp itself in a higher amplitude, becomes at home with itself, so as not to totally forget and lose itself the next time it will sunder itself in the existential realm of its ongoing movement.